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Convergence and divergence of corporate governance may be the most controversial and the 
hottest issue in corporate governance studies. Recently, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Japan, German and other countries have made significant reforms in corporate governance. The 
changes of corporate governance rules and practice in those countries aggravate the controversy 
about convergence of corporate governance. This paper discusses the convergence of the outside 
control model and the inside control model based on the analysis of the changes of governance 
practice of the two models by using the framework of institution change. 
The change of corporate governance institution can be divided into two types: voluntary 
change and mandatory change. The basic drive force of the change of corporate governance is that 
there is potential benefit no matter the change is voluntary or mandatory. Institution change differs 
significantly from technology change. Although the incentive to improve governance efficiency 
would impulse corporate governance reforms and thus increase the convergence of different 
models, there are also many obstructions, technical and political, in the process of converging. The 
most two important reasons why corporate governance of different models could not convergent 
completely may be path dependence and institution complementarities. So, difference between 
existing corporate governance models may be persistence. Since the drive force and barrier exist 
simultaneous, different systems of corporate governance would just be convergent relatively, and 
existing models would be in practice for a long time. 
Since the late of 1990s, there has been a corporate governance campaign all over the world, 
and corporate governance in both outside control model countries and inside control model 
countries has made significant transformations both in law and practice. The most important cause 
of these changes is the competition press which exists both in the level of firms and in the level of 
states and which is aggravated by economy globalization. Such a campaign leads to the 
convergence of different systems of corporate governance to some extent. The convergence is two 
sided, however, that is, the two systems would converge to each other. The most things to be noted 
is neither of the system would diverge its old path completely for path dependence and other 
reasons (including political rent-seeking, et al.).  
Recently, many countries (districts) have transplanted the system of independent director 
which stemmed from the United States. These countries involve not only many common law 
countries, such as the Unite Kingdom, Singapore, but also many continent law (civil law) 
countries (districts) where two tier of boards have been more prevalent, such as Japan, China 
(including Taiwan and the mainland), Korea, et al.. The main objective of those economies is to 
improve corporate governance efficiency by introducing independent director system which works 














political press which comes from developed countries (especially the Unite States) and other 
organizations also plays significant roles in the progress. The globalization of independent director 
system demonstrated the trends of convergence of corporate governance, that is, convergence and 
persistence would exist simultaneously. So different models of corporate governance may 
converge to some extent for the economic and political reasons but they would never converge 
completely for the distinct two characteristics of corporate governance --path dependence and 
institution complementarities. 
China introduced independent director system in 2001 and claimed all the listed companies 
to set up the system mandatory. The outcome of independent director system is not satisfactory, 
however, for the lack of complementary institutions (including legal, political, economic, and 
cultural institutions). From the case of China, we can draw the conclusion that de jure and de 
facto convergence are not synchronous for institutional factors, political factors and maybe 
technical factors. 
The main conclusions of this paper are: (1) partly as the result of the economic and legal 
globalization, the outside control model and the inside control model have converged to some 
extents. The basic drive force of convergence is to increase governance efficiency. On the other 
hand, the convergence could just be relative because of path dependence and institution 
complementarities. (2) Darwinian Nature Evolution Theory can’t demonstrate the change and 
convergence process of corporate governance although it has some rationality. (3) There’s no 
single best corporate governance model in the world. Each model existing has its own advantages 
and disadvantages, and the evaluation of efficiency depend on the situation. So, corporate 
governance would not and should not converge one-sided. (4) China should not induce corporate 
governance institution with regardless of the adaptivity of the institution.  
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    全文分为如下几个部分： 











































































型。Coffee (2000)将公司治理分为两种模式：股权分散模式（Dispersed Ownership 
Model）和股权集中模式（Concentrated Ownership Model）。Mayer (2000)依照控
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